The Objectivity of Morality

Philosophy 51 (195):5 - 20 (1976)
Abstract
The objectivist claims that moral judgments are statements which are true or false. He may be a naturalist or an anti-Naturalist. If a naturalist, He may maintain either that moral properties are natural properties, Or that, Though moral properties are distinct from natural properties, Possession of natural properties sometimes entails possession of moral properties. The only plausible objectivist position is the latter form of naturalism. Various arguments against objectivism are considered, Including the argument that moral matters cannot be settled by argument and the argument that agreement about moral matters involves agreement in attitude, Whereas agreement about factual matters does not. All these arguments are shown to fail. Finally a positive argument in favor of objectivism is put forward
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819100019975
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How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.
Blackburn's Problem: On its Not Insignificant Residue.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.
The Revolutions in English Philosophy and Philosophy of Education.Peter Gilroy - 2013 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 45 (2):202-218.

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