Philosophy 51 (195):5 - 20 (1976)
The objectivist claims that moral judgments are statements which are true or false. He may be a naturalist or an anti-Naturalist. If a naturalist, He may maintain either that moral properties are natural properties, Or that, Though moral properties are distinct from natural properties, Possession of natural properties sometimes entails possession of moral properties. The only plausible objectivist position is the latter form of naturalism. Various arguments against objectivism are considered, Including the argument that moral matters cannot be settled by argument and the argument that agreement about moral matters involves agreement in attitude, Whereas agreement about factual matters does not. All these arguments are shown to fail. Finally a positive argument in favor of objectivism is put forward
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.
Blackburn's Problem: On its Not Insignificant Residue.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.
The Revolutions in English Philosophy and Philosophy of Education.Peter Gilroy - 2013 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 45 (2):202-218.
Similar books and articles
Knowing Enough to Disagree: A New Response to the Moral Twin Earth Argument.Mark van Roojen - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 1. Clarendon Press. pp. 161-94.
Naturalism and Normativity.Seiriol Morgan - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):319 - 344.
The Price of Non-Reductive Moral Realism.Ralph Wedgwood - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):199-215.
Do 'Objectivist' Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?Gunnar Björnsson - 2012 - Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.
Are Children Moral Objectivists? Children's Judgments About Moral and Response-Dependent Properties.Shaun Nichols & Trisha Folds-Bennett - 2003 - Cognition 90 (2):23-32.
Moral Dependence.Nick Zangwill - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-27.
Metaethical Pluralism: How Both Moral Naturalism and Moral Skepticism May Be Permissible Positions.Richard Joyce - unknown
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads41 ( #123,194 of 2,152,625 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #399,611 of 2,152,625 )
How can I increase my downloads?