Abstract
Two themes, both from Husserl's later work, criss-cross in this Cologne dissertation: the move from objective science to the life-world, and the problem of the history of philosophy as a subject in Husserl's thought. The two themes are related, since the modern phenomenon of science, as that which has lost its roots in ordinary experience, is a phenomenon peculiar to the present historical condition of men and not a permanent human problem. According to Janssen, Husserl claims that philosophy has never understood its own sense, and that the history of philosophy has always been an "empty intending" of what it is supposed to achieve; in phenomenology the intention is fulfilled, and its history comes to an end. Now a new sort of development, the clarification of what is already achieved, can be started. This understanding of history is neither deterministic nor random, Janssen says, but it is teleological; it allows science to be accepted as a meaningful achievement of man, and yet prevents science from suffocating freedom and discovery, as an outright idealist reading of history might force it to do. This understanding even demands--and makes possible--a special kind of critical responsibility in the scientist. Underlying this appreciation of history is Husserl's conviction that life is essentially a desire for truth. Philosophy reaches its definitive state by recovering the whole of human experience, especially by overcoming the abstract conception of experience which the objective sciences, and modern philosophy, have taken for the whole; it does this by recognizing and studying the Lebenswelt. Janssen develops these ideas clearly and persuasively.--R. S.