An epistemic solution to Goodman's new Riddle of induction

Synthese 95 (1):55 - 76 (1993)
Abstract
Goodman'snew riddle of induction can be characterized by the following questions: What is the difference between grue and green?; Why is the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue not lawlike?; Why is this hypothesis not confirmed by its positive instances?; and, Why is the predicate grue not projectible? I argue in favor of epistemological answers to Goodman's questions. The notions of lawlikeness, confirmation, and projectibility have to be relativized to (actual and counterfactual) epistemic situations that are determined by the available background information. In order to defend this thesis, I discuss an example that is less strange than the grue example. From the general conclusions of this discussion, it follows that grue is not projectible in the actual epistemic situation, but it is projectible in certain counterfactual epistemic situations.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01064667
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References found in this work BETA
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.
The Web of Belief.W. V. Quine - 1970 - New York: Random House.
Problems and Projects.Nelson Goodman - 1972 - Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Paradoxes.R. M. Sainsbury - 1995 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Projectibility and Explainability or How to Draw a New Picture of Inductive Practices.Rami Israel - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):269 - 286.
Projectibility and Explainability or How to Draw a New Picture of Inductive Practices.Rami Israel - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):269-286.

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On Projecting Grue.John Moreland - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (3):363-377.
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Goodman's "New Riddle".Branden Fitelson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):613 - 643.

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