Fallibilism, Factivity and Epistemically Truth-Guaranteeing Justification

In Nils Gilje & Harald Grimen (eds.), Discursive Modernity. Universitetsforlaget (2007)

Authors
Boris Rähme
Fondazione Bruno Kessler
Abstract
This paper explores the question of how the epistemological thesis of fallibilism should best be formulated. Sections 1 to 3 critically discuss some influential formulations of fallibilism. In section 4 I suggest a formulation of fallibilism in terms of the unavailability of epistemically truth-guaranteeing justification. In section 5 I discuss the claim that unrestricted fallibilism engenders paradox and argue that this claim is unwarranted.
Keywords fallibilism  justification  certainty
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