International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):18-25 (2011)
AbstractThough it seems rather surprising in retrospect, until about twenty-ﬁve years ago no philosopher in the Western tradition had explicitly formulated the question whether there could be an epistemic analogue to practical akrasia. Also surprisingly, despite the prima facie analogue with practical akrasia (the possibility of which is not much disputed), much of the recent work on this question has defended the rather bold view that epistemic akrasia is impossible. While the arguments purporting to show the impossibility of epistemic akrasia have been criticized by some, I propose instead to make a head-on attack and defend the substantive view that epistemic akrasia is possible — indeed, actual. This leaves for another day the project of diagnosing exactly where the arguments for the impossibility of epistemic akrasia go wrong. Here, I content myself with trying to show that they must go wrong, since — as I will argue — epistemic akrasia is possible.
Similar books and articles
Epistemic Akrasia and the Subsumption of Evidence: A Reconsideration.Neil Levy - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):149-156.
Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus.Christopher Bobonich & Pierre Destrée (eds.) - 2007 - Brill.
Regulating Inquiry.Christopher Hookway - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:149-157.
The Will as Practical Reason and the Problem of Akrasia.Daniel Guevara - 2009 - Review of Metaphysics 62 (3):525-550.
Epistemic commitments, epistemic agency and practical reasons.Michael P. Lynch - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):343-362.
Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Epistemic akrasia and the fallibility of critical reasoning.Cristina Borgoni & Yannig Luthra - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):877-886.
Defending Evidence-Resistant Beliefs.Nikolai Viedge - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):517-537.
What Is Wrong With Agnostic Belief?Yuval Avnur - 2020 - In Agnosticism: Explorations in Philosophy and Religious Thought. pp. Ch 2.
References found in this work
Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-deception, and Self-control.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Oxford University Press.