Is Pyrrhonism Psychologically Possible?

Ancient Philosophy 22 (2):319-331 (2002)
In this paper I aim to address--and also to better understand--what is perhaps the most intuitive objection to Pyrrhonian skepticism, namely, that to completely suspend one's judgment is psychologically impossible. I propose to come to an understanding of Sextus's relation to this objection by trying to more clearly understand Sextus's claims about the "Skeptic". I hope to show that it is at least possible for us to understand Sextus and his claims about the "Skeptic" without being driven to either (1) invoke restrictive interpretations of his claims or (2) adopt implausible hypotheses concerning his sincerity
Keywords pyrrhonism  skepticism  epoche
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DOI 10.5840/ancientphil200222227
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