Automated discovery of linear feedback models


The introduction of statistical models represented by directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) has proved fruitful in the construction of expert systems, in allowing efficient updating algorithms that take advantage of conditional independence relations (Pearl, 1988, Lauritzen et al. 1993), and in inferring causal structure from conditional independence relations (Spirtes and Glymour, 1991, Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, 1993, Pearl and Verma, 1991, Cooper, 1992). As a framework for representing the combination of causal and statistical hypotheses, DAG models have shed light on a number of issues in statistics ranging from Simpson’s Paradox to experimental design (Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, 1993). The relations of DAGs with statistical constraints, and the equivalence and distinguishability properties of DAG models, are now well understood, and their characterization and computation involves three properties connecting graphical structure and probability distributions: (i) a local directed Markov property, (ii) a global directed Markov property, (iii) and factorizations of joint densities according to the structure of a graph (Lauritizen, et al., 1990).



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The Ontic Account of Scientific Explanation.Carl F. Craver - 2014 - In Marie I. Kaiser, Oliver R. Scholz, Daniel Plenge & Andreas Hüttemann (eds.), Explanation in the Special Sciences: The Case of Biology and History. Springer Verlag. pp. 27-52.
Indeterminism and the causal Markov condition.Daniel Steel - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):3-26.
Comment on Hausman & Woodward on the causal Markov condition.Daniel Steel - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):219-231.

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