Topoi 22 (1):55-67 (2003)

It is often claimed that epistemological thought divides around the issue of the place of experience in knowledge: While empiricists argue that experience is the only legitimate source of knowledge, rationalists find other such sources. The trouble with such accounts is not that they are wrong, but that they are incomplete. On occasion, epistemological differences run deeper, raising the very notion of experience as an issue for epistemology. This paper looks at two epistemological debates which concerned not simply the place of experience in knowledge but also the appropriate account of experience itself. The first episode is the rise of Marburg Neo-Kantianism in the 1870s – in particular the seminal work of Hermann Cohen in his Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1871). Cohen's principal point was that Kant's significance as an epistemologist was in providing a new theory of experience, one that tied experience to exact science and led to a new stress on the formal conditions of exact knowledge. The second episode is Carnap's rejection of epistemology in the 1930s in favour of a program of the logic of science. My focus in each case will be the interplay between an epistemology focused on exact science as the locus of knowledge and a concomitant call for logical methods in epistemology.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Philosophy of Science   Philosophy of Technology
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DOI 10.1023/A:1022132704044
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References found in this work BETA

The Logical Structure of the World.Rudolf Carnap - 1967 - Berkeley: University of California Press.
Replies and Systematic Expositions.Rudolf Carnap - 1963 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), ¸ Iteschilpp:Prc. Open Court. pp. 859--1013.
Carnaps 'Aufbau' in kantianischer Sicht.Werner Sauer - 1985 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 23 (1):19-35.

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Citations of this work BETA

Hermann Cohen.Scott Edgar - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Kuhn's Kantian Dimensions.Lydia Patton - 2021 - In K. Brad Wray (ed.), Interpreting Kuhn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 27-44.

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