Utilitas 12 (1):25 (2000)

Richard Dean
California State University, Los Angeles
In Kantian Consequentialism, David Cummiskey argues that the central ideas of Kant's moral philosophy provide claims about value which, if applied consistently, lead to consequentialist normative principles. While Kant himself was not a consequentialist, Cummiskey thinks he should have been, given his fundamental positions in ethics. I argue that Cummiskey is mistaken. Cummiskey's argument relies on a non-Kantian idea about value, namely that value can be defined, and objects with value identified, conceptually prior to and independent of the choices that a rational agent would make. The contrasting Kantian concept of value is that to possess value is to be the object of of rational choice. Inasmuch as Cummiskey gives no reason to reject the Kantian account of value in favour of his own account, his argument does not establish that Kant's ethics inevitably leads to normative consequentialism
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820800002594
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References found in this work BETA

Humanity as End in Itself.Allen Wood - 1995 - Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress 1:301-319.
What Should We Treat as an End in Itself?Richard Dean - 1996 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4):268-288.

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Kant's Conception of Inner Value.Oliver Sensen - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):262-280.
Kant's Theory of Punishment.Thom Brooks - 2003 - Utilitas 15 (2):206.
Parfit Und Kant Über Vernünftige Zustimmung ​.Martin Sticker - 2016 - Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):221-254.

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