In R. Keith Loftin & Joshua Farris (eds.), Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms. Lanham: Lexington Books. pp. 295-317 (2018)

Brandon Rickabaugh
Palm Beach Atlantic University
According to the Christian doctrine of bodily resurrection, human persons will have an embodied existence in eternity. Many Christian materialists, especially Lynne Rudder Baker, Trenton Merricks, and Kevin Corcoran, argue that the doctrine of bodily resurrection creates serious problems for substance dualism (dualism). These critiques argued that bodily resurrection is made trivial by dualism, that dualism makes it difficult if not impossible to explain why we need to be embodied, or that dualism should be rejected as bodily resurrection is better accounted for by a materialist view. As of yet, there has been no systematic analysis of these arguments in the literature. This paper fills that gap and argues that each of these objections to dualism fail. In making these arguments I make use of neo-Aristotelian metaphysics to provide a theory of embodiment for substance dualism. Accordingly, the body is a complex structural mode of the soul. The essence of the soul is the internal efficient cause and teleological guide of the functions and structure of the body. As such, the body is an ensouled physical structure, not a mere physical machine, but has both physical and non-physical aspects.
Keywords Christian Physicalism  Substance Dualism  Soul  Philosophical Anthopology  Ontology of Human Persons
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Evolution of the Soul.Richard Swinburne - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
The Possibility of Resurrection.Peter Van Inwagen - 1978 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (2):114-121.
Materialism and Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2007 - In Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford University Press. pp. 99--141.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism?William G. Lycan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
'Need a Christian Be a Mind/Body Dualist' ?Lynne Rudder Baker - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):489-504.
Persons and Bodies.Kevin J. Corcoran - 1998 - Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):324-340.
How Valuable Could a Material Object Be?Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):332-343.
A New Objection to A Priori Arguments for Dualism.Trenton Merricks - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1):81-85.
Degrees of Separation in the Phaedo.Michael Pakaluk - 2003 - Phronesis 48 (2):89 - 115.


Added to PP index

Total views
306 ( #30,150 of 2,449,013 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #26,339 of 2,449,013 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes