Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):551 - 570 (1995)

Mark Richard
Harvard University
Propositional Attitudes defends an account of ‘believes’ on which the verb is contextually sensitive. x believes that S says that x has a belief which is ‘well rendered’ or acceptably translated by S; since contextually variable information about what makes for a good translation helps determine the extension of ‘believes,’ the verb is contextually sensitive. Sider and Soames criticize this account. They say it has unacceptable consequences in cases in which we make multiple ascriptions of belief to a single individual - as happens, for example, when we say that Odile believes such and such, that the woman in the corner believes so and so, but are ignorant of the identity of Odile and the woman in the corner.I will distinguish two objections along these lines, and argue that neither is forceful. The objections differ as to whether or not the speaker mistakenly presupposes that the believers under discussion are distinct.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI 10.1080/00455091.1995.10717426
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References found in this work BETA

Beyond Singular Propositions?Scott Soames - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):515 - 549.
Three Problems for Richard’s Theory of Belief Ascription.Theodore Sider - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):487 - 513.

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Citations of this work BETA

Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap?Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):93-118.
Gradable Adjectives: A Defence of Pluralism.Keith DeRose - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):141-160.
Propositional Attitude Reports.Thomas McKay - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Pragmatic Defense of Millianism.Arvid Båve - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):271 - 289.
Understanding and Disagreement in Belief Ascription.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2):183-200.

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