Hume's and Smith's Partial Sympathies and Impartial Stances

Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (2):135-158 (2007)
The moral psychology of sympathy is the linchpin of the sentimentalist moral theories of both David Hume and Adam Smith. In this paper, I attempt to diagnose the critical differences between Hume's and Smith's respective accounts of sympathy in order to argue that Smithian sympathy is more properly suited to serve as a basis for impartial moral evaluations and judgments than is Humean sympathy. By way of arguing this claim, I take up the problem of overcoming sympathetic partiality in the construction of a moral point of view, acknowledged by both writers, as my primary platform. My contention is that Humean sympathy is too mechanistic to actually deliver an impartial adjudicatory perspective, and that Smithian sympathy, with its evaluative, imaginative components, succeeds where Hume's account falls short. The paper is comprised of six sections: (i) introductory remarks, (ii) a discussion of Humean sympathy, (iii) a discussion of Smithian sympathy and its distinctness, (iv) a critical analysis of Hume's attempt to correct for sympathetic partiality in the construction of the judicial spectator's general point of view, (v) a critical discussion of sympathetic partiality in Smithian sympathy & (vi) a critical analysis of Smith's construction of the impartial spectator perspective as a moral point of view.
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DOI 10.3366/jsp.2007.5.2.135
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References found in this work BETA
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1739/2000 - Oxford University Press.
A Theory of Justice.John Rawls - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophy and Rhetoric. Oxford University Press. pp. 133-135.
After Virtue.A. Macintyre - 1981 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 46 (1):169-171.

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Citations of this work BETA
Relaxing a Tension in Adam Smith's Account of Sympathy.John W. McHugh - 2011 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9 (2):189-204.

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