Res Philosophica 91 (2):215-239 (2014)
AbstractHow should interaction between the senses affect thought about them? I try to capture some ways in which non sense-specific perception might be thought to make it impossible or pointless or explanatorily idle to distinguish between senses. This task is complicated by there being more than one view of the nature of the senses, and more than one kind of non sense-specific perception. I argue, in particular, that provided we are willing to forgo certain assumptions about, for instance, the relationship between modes or kinds of experience, and about how one should count perceptual experiences at a time, at least one way of thinking about the senses survives the occurrence of various kinds of non sense-specific perception relatively unscathed
Similar books and articles
Perception and Its Modalities.Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.) - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
The Individuation of the Senses.Mohan Matthen - 2015 - In Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press. pp. 567-586.
Truth and error in Aristotle's theory of sense perception.Irving Block - 1961 - Philosophical Quarterly 11 (42):1-9.
Inner-Sense.Vincent Picciuto & Peter Carruthers - forthcoming - In Biggs S., Matthen M. & Stokes D. (eds.), Perception and its Modalites. Oxford University Press.
Common sense and Berkeley's perception by suggestion.Jody Graham - 1997 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (3):397 – 423.
The significance of the senses.Matthew Nudds - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):31-51.
Sorting the Senses.Stephen Biggs, Mohan Matthen & Dustin Stokes - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and its Modalities. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-19.
The senses as psychological kinds.Matthew Nudds - 2007 - In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
Common sense about qualities and senses.Peter W. Ross - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):299 - 316.
The Space of Sensory Modalities.Fiona Macpherson - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press.
Barry Miller on proper names.Donald Nute - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):237 – 239.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Sensory modalities and novel features of perceptual experiences.Douglas C. Wadle - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9841-9872.
Structure of perceptual objects: introduction to the Synthese topical collection.Alfredo Vernazzani, Błażej Skrzypulec & Tobias Schlicht - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1819-1830.
References found in this work
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.Peter Frederick Strawson - 1959 - London, England: Routledge.
The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action.Matthew Soteriou - 2013 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.