Perspectives on Science 10 (3):253-274 (2002)

Abstract
: This essay explores some themes in use of a relativized Kantian a priori in the work of Thomas Kuhn and Michael Friedman. It teases out some shared and some divergent beliefs and attitudes in these two philosophers by comparing their characteristic questions and problems to the questions and problems that seem most appropriately to attend to an adequate understanding of games and their histories. It argues for a way forward within a relativized Kantian framework that is suggested but not argued for in Friedman (2001): philosophers of science should move from a concern with unreason as meaninglessness to a concern with unreason as argumentative coercion. It ends with a few suggestions regarding a place for philosophy in the history of reason
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1162/106361402321899050
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,274
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reconsidering Logical Positivism.Michael Friedman - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
The Empirical Stance.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2002 - Yale University Press.
The Empirical Stance.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 2002 - Yale University Press.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Specialisation and the Incommensurability Among Scientific Specialties.Vincenzo Politi - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 50 (1):129-144.
A Role for Reason in Science.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (3):573-598.
De-Synthesizing the Relative a Priori.Thomas Uebel - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):7-17.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
97 ( #110,749 of 2,448,602 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #179,444 of 2,448,602 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes