On the consistency of second-order contextual definitions

Noûs 26 (4):491-494 (1992)
Abstract
One of the earliest discussions of the so-called 'bad company' objection to Neo-Fregeanism, I show that the consistency of an arbitrary second-order 'contextual definition' (nowadays known as an 'abstraction principle' is recursively undecidable. I go on to suggest that an acceptable such principle should satisfy a condition nowadays known as 'stablity'.
Keywords Frege  Bad Company
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DOI 10.2307/2216025
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Bad Company and Neo-Fregean Philosophy.Matti Eklund - 2009 - Synthese 170 (3):393-414.
Introduction.Øystein Linnebo - 2009 - Synthese 170 (3):321-329.
Which Abstraction Principles Are Acceptable? Some Limitative Results.Øystein Linnebo & Gabriel Uzquiano - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):239-252.
What is Neologicism?Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta - 2006 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):60-99.

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