Rationality revisited

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):392 – 403 (1984)
This paper looks at a dispute decision theory about how best to characterize expected utility maximization and express the logic of rational choice. Where A1, … , An are actions open to some particular agent, and S1, … , Sn are mutually exclusive states of the world such that the agent knows at least one of which obtains, does the logic of rational choice require an agent to consider the conditional probability of choice Ai given that some state Si obtains, Prob(Ai/Si). Or, is the logic of choice better represented by considering the probability of the counterfactual if Ai then Si, Prob(Ai ⟥-> Si). Causal decision theory, developed by Allan Gibbard, William Harper, and David Lewis defend the counterfactual analysis; whereas, Richard Jeffrey and others defend the conditional probability analysis, evidential decision theory. I argue that the problems posed by cases of decision instability favor evidential decision theory.
Keywords decision theory  causal decision theory  evidential decision theory  rational choice  expected utility  Newcomb's Paradox  decision instability  Death in Aleppo
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048408412341601
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,411
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Paul Weirich (1985). Decision Instability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):465 – 472.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

57 ( #85,610 of 1,924,752 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #96,510 of 1,924,752 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.