Rationality revisited

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):392 – 403 (1984)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper looks at a dispute decision theory about how best to characterize expected utility maximization and express the logic of rational choice. Where A1, … , An are actions open to some particular agent, and S1, … , Sn are mutually exclusive states of the world such that the agent knows at least one of which obtains, does the logic of rational choice require an agent to consider the conditional probability of choice Ai given that some state Si obtains, Prob(Ai/Si). Or, is the logic of choice better represented by considering the probability of the counterfactual if Ai then Si, Prob(Ai ⟥-> Si). Causal decision theory, developed by Allan Gibbard, William Harper, and David Lewis defend the counterfactual analysis; whereas, Richard Jeffrey and others defend the conditional probability analysis, evidential decision theory. I argue that the problems posed by cases of decision instability favor evidential decision theory.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Some counterexamples to causal decision theory.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (1):93-114.
Causal Decision Theory.Ellery Eells - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:177 - 200.
Why we still need the logic of decision.James M. Joyce - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):13.
Evidential decision theory and medical newcomb problems.Arif Ahmed - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):191-198.
Actualist rationality.Charles F. Manski - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (2):195-210.


Added to PP

122 (#144,494)

6 months
9 (#290,637)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Reed Richter
University of California, Irvine (PhD)

Citations of this work

Causal Decision Theory and Decision Instability.Brad Armendt - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (5):263-277.
Riches and Rationality.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):114-129.

View all 26 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references