Rawlsian social-contract theory and the severely disabled

Journal of Ethics 10 (4):419 - 462 (2006)
Abstract
Martha Nussbaum has powerfully argued in Frontiers ofJustice and elsewhere that John Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory cannot usefully be deployed to deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled. To counter this claim, this article deploys Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory in order to deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled—or, since, as Nussbaum stresses, we all have some degree of disability—for the severely disabled. In this way, rather than questioning one by one Nussbaum’s interpretive claims about Rawls’s view, one can simply see how the Rawlsian framework can work in application to this issue. Following Rawls’s lead, the paper utilizes the idealized “initial choice situation” as an analytic and comparative device for examining alternative principles of justice, developing three different interpretations of the initial choice situation that each correspond to a different set of principles that apply to people of all levels of disability. One of these sets of principles is a simple extension of Rawls’s, one is very close to what Nussbaum herself recommends, and the third is a kind of hybrid. In this way, it is shown not only that Rawls’s social-contract device can usefully be applied to these issues, but also that it is helpful for exploring the deep commitments underlying each of these competing sets of principles.
Keywords Disability  justice  Martha Nussbaum  John Rawls  reciprocity  social contract  veil of ignorance
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Reprint years 2007
DOI 10.1007/s10892-006-9000-5
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Disability and Justice.Christie Hartley - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (2):120-132.
Political Liberalism and the Justice Claims of the Disabled: A Reconciliation.Gabriele Badano - 2014 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17 (4):1-22.
Are the Kids Alright? Rawls, Adoption, and Gay Parents.Ryan Reed - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):969-982.

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