The Sense of Communication

Mind 104 (413):79 - 106 (1995)
Many philosophers nowadays believe Frege was right about belief, but wrong about language: The contents of beliefs need to be individuated more finely than in terms of Russellian propositions, but the contents of utterances do not. I argue that this 'hybrid view' cannot offer no reasonable account of how communication transfers knowledge from one speaker to another and that, to do so, we must insist that understanding depends upon more than just getting the references of terms right.
Keywords Frege  Sense
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DOI 10.1093/mind/104.413.79
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Relational Approaches to Frege's Puzzle.Aidan Gray - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (10):e12429.
How Proper Names Refer.Imogen Dickie - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):43-78.
Communication and Indexical Reference.Jonas Åkerman - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):355 - 366.

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