American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2):157-178 (1998)

Authors
Michael Ridge
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
Many hold that the differences between intentions and desires are so significant that, not only can we not identify intentions with desires simpliciter, but that intentions are irreducible to any subclass of desires. My main aim is to explain why we should reject the irreducibility thesis in both forms, thereby defending the Humean view of action explanation.
Keywords Humeanism  desire  plans
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The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Why Cognitivism?Yair Levy - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):223-244.
Intention as Faith: Rae Langton.Rae Langton - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:243-258.

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