Synthese 197 (8):3325-3347 (2020)
AbstractQuasi-realists aspire to accommodate core features of ordinary normative thought and discourse in an expressivist framework. One apparent such feature is that we can be more or less confident in our normative judgments—they vary in credence. Michael Smith has argued that quasi-realists cannot plausibly accommodate these distinctions simply because they understand normative judgments as desires, but desires lack the structure needed to distinguish these three features. Existing attempts to meet Smith’s challenge have accepted Smith’s presupposition that the way to meet the challenge is to show that normative judgments have more structure than they initially seem to have. I argue that accepting this presupposition is accepting too much. The orthodox view of certitude, insofar as there is one, understands certitude very roughly in terms of counterfactual betting behaviour. Counterfactual betting behaviour, though, is not in any useful sense a structural feature of a given judgment. It is rather a more holistic feature of a given agent’s cognitive system. Insofar as it can meet the other challenges it faces, quasi-realism can characterize credences in terms of counterfactual betting behaviour and effectively say exactly what many realists will want to say about credences, thus meeting Smith’s challenge much more directly.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
Citations of this work
Fallibility for Expressivists.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):763-777.
A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2789-2813.
Interpretative Expressivism: A Theory of Normative Belief.James L. D. Brown - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):1-20.
Quasi-realism and normative certitude.Stina Björkholm, Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2021 - Synthese 198 (8):7861-7869.
Uncertain Values: An Axiomatic Approach to Axiological Uncertainty.Stefan Riedener - 2021 - Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.
Similar books and articles
Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-8.
Communication for Expressivists.Alejandro Pérez Carballo & Paolo Santorio - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):607-635.
The Truth in Ecumenical Expressivism.Michael Ridge - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):573-599.
Explaining Disagreement: A Problem for (Some) Hybrid Expressivists.John Eriksson - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):39-53.
II—Michael Ridge: Epistemology for Ecumenical Expressivists.Michael Ridge - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):83-108.
Certitude de l'Espérance Et «Certitude de la Gr'ce ». Contribution au Dialogue Oecuménique.J. Alfaro - 1972 - Nouvelle Revue Théologique 94 (1):3-42.
Epistemology for Ecumenical Expressivists.Michael Ridge - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 81:83-108.
Relativism and the Expressivist Bifurcation.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):357-378.
Nikolaus von Autrecourt über das erste Prinzip und die Gewißheit von Sätzen.Andrej Krause - 2009 - Vivarium 47 (4):407-420.
Deutlichkeit, Évidence Et Certitude Dans les Réponses anonymesDeutlichkeit, Évidence and Certitude in the Anonymous Anwers.Paola Basso - 2011 - Astérion 9.