Authors
Michael Ridge
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
I offer new arguments for an unorthodox reading of J. L. Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, one on which Mackie does not think all substantive moral claims are false, but allows that a proper subset of them are true. Further, those that are true should be understood in terms of a “hybrid theory”. The proposed reading is one on which Mackie is a conceptual pruner, arguing that we should prune away error-ridden moral claims but hold onto those already free of error. This reading is very different from the standard ones found in the literature. I build on recent work by Moberger and argue that this reading is better corroborated by close attention to the way in which Mackie argues at length that terms like “good” and “ought” are systematically context-sensitive, as well as by considerable additional textual evidence. This reading, however, faces an important challenge—to explain in what sense, if any, morality retains its “normativity” on the proposed reading. I argue that this challenge can be met, at least given some of Mackie’s further assumptions about the nature of rationality.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.15173/jhap.v8i4.4000
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,848
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Mackie’s Conceptual Reform Moral Error Theory.Wouter Floris Kalf - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry 2 (53):1-17.
Not Just Errors: A New Interpretation of Mackie’s Error Theory.Victor Moberger - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (3).
Ethics, Inventing Right and Wrong. [REVIEW]M. J. - 1980 - Review of Metaphysics 34 (1):152-153.
Sympathy for the Error Theorist: Parfit and Mackie.David Phillips - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):559-566.
Mackie's Motivational Argument.Philip Clark - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (ed.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
The Mackiean Supervenience Challenge.Victor Moberger - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):219-236.
In Defense of Moral Error Theory.Jonas Olson - 2011 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
The Objectivity of Ethics.Michael Bissex - 2019 - Catholic Social Science Review 24:75-89.
Mackie's Error Theory and Reasons.Douglas Farland - 2005 - South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):1-13.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-04-21

Total views
18 ( #573,559 of 2,432,819 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #169,987 of 2,432,819 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes