Philosophical Studies 131 (2):487-510 (2006)

Authors
Michael Ridge
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
What is it for a speech-act to be sincere? A very tempting answer, defended by John Searle and others, is that a speech-act is sincere just in case the speaker has the state of mind it expresses. I argue that we should instead hold that a speech-act is sincere just in case the speaker believes that she has the state of mind she believes it expresses (Sections 1 and 2). Scenarios in which speakers are deluded about their own states of mind play an important role in arguing for this account. In the course of developing this account I also explore how it might make good use of the often neglected distinction between insincerity and mere non-sincerity (Section 2). After defending and developing my positive proposal, I explore its implications for debates over expressivism in meta-ethics (Sections 3 and 4).
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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Reprint years 2006
DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-2218-4
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References found in this work BETA

Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.William P. Alston - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 20 (79):172-179.
Meaning, Expression and Thought.Wayne A. Davis - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation.Caj Strandberg - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.
Insincerity.Andreas Stokke - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):496-520.
Disagreement.Mike Ridge - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):41-63.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

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