Authors
Michael Ridge
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
This paper contends that a Kantian universalizability constraint on theories of practical reason in conjunction with the possibility of collective rational agents entails the surprisingly strong conclusion that no fully agent-relative theory of practical reason can be sound. The basic point is that a Kantian universalizability constraint, the thesis that all reasons for action are agent-relative and the possibility of collective rational agents gives rise to a contradiction. This contradiction can be avoided by either rejecting Kantian universalizability, the possibility of collective rational agents, or the tenability of a fully agent-relative theory of practical reason; we cannot have all three.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI ppr200570169
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Responding Appropriately to the Impersonal Good.Jörg Löschke - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (3):701-714.
Expressivism and Collectives.Michael Ridge - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):833-861.

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