Analysis 79 (3):470-476 (2019)

Authors
Michael Rieppel
Syracuse University
Abstract
Yli-Vakkuri argues that content externalism can be established without thought experiments, as the deductive consequence of a pair of uncontroversial principles about beliefs, contents and truth. I argue that the most dialectically plausible motivation for the first principle, that truth is a broad property or beliefs, undermines the second principle, that the truth-value of a belief goes hand-in-hand with that of its content, and that other motivations are likely to depend on externalist thought experiments the argument was meant to avoid. As it stands, the argument for externalism therefore fails.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/any085
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References found in this work BETA

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