Denoting and Disquoting

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):548-561 (2018)
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Abstract

ABSTRACTFregeans hold that predicates denote things, albeit things different in kind from what singular terms denote. This leads to a familiar problem: it seems impossible to say what any given predicate denotes. One strategy for avoiding this problem reduces the Fregean position to form of nominalism. I develop an alternative strategy that lets the Fregean hold on to the view that predicate denote things by reconceiving the nature of singular denotation and of Fregean objects.

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Michael Rieppel
Syracuse University

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Reference by proxy.Michael Rieppel - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.

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