Defending a simple theory of conditionals

American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (3):253-260 (2015)

Authors
Adam Rieger
Glasgow University
Abstract
This paper extends the defense of a simple theory of indicative conditionals previously proposed by the author, in which the truth conditions are material, and Grice-style assertability conditions are given to explain the paradoxes of material implication. The paper discusses various apparent counter-examples to the material account in which conditionals are not asserted, and so the original theory cannot be applied; it is argued that, nevertheless, the material theory can be defended.
Keywords Conditionals  Indicative conditionals  Material conditional  Truth functional conditionals
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Studies in the Way of Words.D. E. Over - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (160):393-395.
On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
Introduction to Non-Classical Logic.Graham Priest - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic.Graham Priest - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):294-295.

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Citations of this work BETA

The counterfactual direct argument.Simon Goldstein - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (2):193-232.

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