Stoic disagreement and belief retention

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):243-262 (2011)

Abstract
Propositions are generally thought to have a truth-value only relative to some parameter or sequence of parameters. Many apparently straightforward notions, like what it is to disagree or retain a belief, become harder to explain once propositional truth is thus relativized. An account of disagreement within a framework involving such ‘stoic’ propositions is here presented. Some resources developed in that account are then used to respond to the eternalist charge that temporalist propositions can't function as belief contents because they don't allow us to make adequate sense of what belief retention amounts to
Keywords philpapers: relativism about truth
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01396.x
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References found in this work BETA

Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
Nonindexical Contextualism.John MacFarlane - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):231-250.

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Citations of this work BETA

Philosophical Equilibrism, Rationality, and the Commitment Challenge.Michele Palmira - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (3):377-385.
Disagreement and Dispute.Delia Belleri - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):289-307.

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