Stanley's Three Flaws

Swiss Philosophical Preprints (2010)

Authors
Abstract
In this essay, I shall briefly present Epistemic Contextualism (EC), Invariantism and Interest- Relative Invariantism (IRI) (section 2). Then I will discuss three theses of Jason Stanley’s Knowledge and Practical Interests (Oxford 2005). I argue that Stanley’s case against Contextualism is based on a misconception of its semantic nature, that there is a disadvantage for Interest-Relative Invariantism in terms of the sceptical paradox and that Stanley’s explanation of intuitions can be interpreted in favour of Contextualism (sections 3.1. - 3.3.).
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach.Robin McKenna - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):101-123.
Interest-Relative Invariantism and Knowledge From Ignorance.Federico Luzzi - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):31-42.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):180-187.
Interest-Relative Invariantism. [REVIEW]Stephen Schiffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):188 - 195.
Knowing‐Wh and Embedded Questions.Ted Parent - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (2):81-95.
Knowledge by Indifference.Gillian Russell & John Doris - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):429 – 437.
Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Primary Speaker Meaning. [REVIEW]Gilbert Harman - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):173-179.
Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-11-25

Total views
24 ( #335,579 of 2,237,181 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #190,757 of 2,237,181 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature