Theory and Decision 60 (1):69-111 (2006)

Abstract
How can cooperation be achieved between self-interested individuals in commonly-occurring asymmetric interactions where agents have different positions? Should agents use the same strategies that are appropriate for symmetric social situations? We explore these questions through the asymmetric interaction captured in the indefinitely repeated investment game. In every period of this game, the first player decides how much of an endowment he wants to invest, then this amount is tripled and passed to the second player, who finally decides how much of the tripled investment she wants to return to the first player. The results of three evolutionary studies demonstrate that the best-performing strategies for this asymmetric game differ from those for a similar but symmetric game, the indefinitely repeated Prisoner’s dilemma game. The strategies that enable cooperation for the asymmetric IG react more sensitively to exploitation, meaning that cooperation can more easily break down. Furthermore, once cooperation has stopped, it is much more difficult to reestablish than in symmetric situations. Based on these results, the presence of asymmetry in an interaction appears to be an important factor affecting adaptive behavior in these common social situations.
Keywords bargaining  evolutionary stable strategies  finite state automata  investment game  repeated games
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11238-005-6014-6
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,707
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Game Theory and the Evolution of Behaviour.J. Maynard Smith - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):95.
The Inapplicability of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma.Louis Marinoff - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (4):461-472.
The Ecology of Cooperation.Robert Hoffmann - 2001 - Theory and Decision 50 (2):101-118.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Cooperative Field Theory is Critical for Embodiment.Patrick D. Roberts - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):59-60.
The Evolution of Non-Market Strategies in a Changing Regulatory Environment.Mika Skippari & Päivi Holmlund - 2007 - Proceedings of the International Association for Business and Society 18:412-415.
V. Is the Prisoners' Dilemma All of Sociology?Arthur L. Stinchcombe - 1980 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):187 – 192.
What Niche Did Human Cooperativeness Evolve In?Hannes Rusch - 2013 - Ethics and Politics 15 (2):82-100.
Participation in the Company of HBK-Spaarbank.M. Lambrechts & P. Van Steenbergen - 1999 - Journal of Business Ethics 21 (2/3):137 - 144.
Feeling Off Balance? Need an Alignment?Linda C. Rodríguez & Ivan Montiel - 2008 - Proceedings of the International Association for Business and Society 19:162-171.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-10-31

Total views
84 ( #110,173 of 2,333,391 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #395,985 of 2,333,391 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes