Erkenntnis 54 (2):195-203 (2001)

Authors
Adam Rieger
Glasgow University
Abstract
A view often expressed is that to classify the liar sentence as neither true nor false is satisfactory for the simple liar but not for the strengthened liar. I argue that in fact it is equally unsatisfactory for both liars. I go on to discuss whether, nevertheless, Kripke''s theory of truth represents an advance on that of Tarski.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1005600831298
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References found in this work BETA

Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox.Robert L. Martin (ed.) - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types.Bertrand Russell - 1908 - American Journal of Mathematics 30 (3):222-262.
Presupposition, Implication, and Self-Reference.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):136-152.

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Citations of this work BETA

A New–Old Characterisation of Logical Knowledge.Ivor Grattan-Guinness - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (3):245 - 290.

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