A critique of Mellor's argument against 'backwards' causation

Abstract
In this paper, criticisms are made of the main tenets of Professor Mellor's argument against ‘backwards’ causation. He requires a closed causal chain of events if there is to be ‘backwards’ causation, but this condition is a metaphysical assumption which he cannot totally substantiate. Other objections to Mellor's argument concern his probabilistic analysis of causation, and the use to which he puts this analysis. In particular, his use of conditional probability inequality to establish the ‘direction’ of causation is shown to be in error. 1I am indebted to Drs H. Krips, L. O'Neill and to the anonymous referee for their suggestions and critical comments on earlier drafts.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/42.1.75
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The Impossibility of Backwards Causation.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):439–455.
Time Travel Without Causal Loops.Bradley Monton - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):54-67.
The Logical Asymmetry of Causation.Yuval Steinitz - 1994 - Philosophical Papers 23 (1):49-57.

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