Acta Analytica 23 (1):1-8 (2008)

Wayne Riggs
University of Oklahoma
It is generally assumed that there are (at least) two fundamental epistemic goals: believing truths, and avoiding the acceptance of falsehoods. As has been often noted, these goals are in conflict with one another. Moreover, the norms governing rational belief that we should derive from these two goals depend on how we weight them relative to one another. However, it is not obvious that there is one objectively correct weighting for everyone in all circumstances. Indeed, as I shall argue, it looks as though there are circumstances in which a range of possible weightings of the two goals are all equally epistemically rational.
Keywords Justification  Epistemology  Risk  Relativism  Theory of knowledge
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-008-0020-6
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References found in this work BETA

Balancing Our Epistemic Goals.Wayne D. Riggs - 2003 - Noûs 37 (2):342–352.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.
Friendship and Epistemic Norms.Jason Kawall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):349-370.

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