Synthese 169 (1):201-216 (2009)

Wayne Riggs
University of Oklahoma
In this paper I defend the theory that knowledge is credit-worthy true belief against a family of objections, one of which was leveled against it in a recent paper by Jennifer Lackey. In that paper, Lackey argues that testimonial knowledge is problematic for the credit-worthiness theory because when person A comes to know that p by way of the testimony of person B, it would appear that any credit due to A for coming to believe truly that p belongs to the testifier, B, rather than the hearer, A. If so, then knowledge would appear not to be a matter of credit for true belief. I think that the problem this raises actually has little to do with the fact that the knowledge comes by way of testimony, and that similar objections can be formulated in terms of perceptual and memorial knowledge. I will attempt to neutralize these objections by drawing a distinction between credit as praiseworthiness and credit as attributability
Keywords Philosophy   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language   Logic   Epistemology   Computer Science, general   Philosophy of Science
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-008-9342-6
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Citations of this work BETA

Knowledge and Credit.Jennifer Lackey - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.
What Luck is Not.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):255 – 267.
Knowledge: The Safe-Apt View.Christoph9 Kelp - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):265-278.

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