Philosophy of Science 81 (1):81-100 (2014)

Authors
Susanna Rinard
Harvard University
Abstract
The canonical Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox faces a problem: it entails that black non-ravens disconfirm the hypothesis that all ravens are black. I provide a new solution that avoids this problem. On my solution, black ravens confirm that all ravens are black, while non-black non-ravens and black non-ravens are neutral. My approach is grounded in certain relations of epistemic dependence, which, in turn, are grounded in the fact that the kind raven is more natural than the kind black. The solution applies to any generalization “All F’s are G” in which F is more natural than G.
Keywords paradox of confirmation  ravens paradox  bayesianism  natural kind  instance confirmation  Nicod's condition  Nicod's criterion  Hempel
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DOI 10.1086/674202
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References found in this work BETA

A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
Epistemology Naturalized.W. V. Quine - 1969 - In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Conciliatory Answer to the Paradox of the Ravens.William Peden - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):45-64.
Bayesian Confirmation, Connexivism and an Unkindness of Ravens.Elisangela Ramirez - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Logic 15 (2):449-475.

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