Noûs (4):763-784 (2018)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Some prominent evidentialists argue that practical considerations cannot be normative reasons for belief because they can’t be motivating reasons for belief. Existing pragmatist responses turn out to depend on the assumption that it’s possible to believe in the absence of evidence. The evidentialist may deny this, at which point the debate ends in an impasse. I propose a new strategy for the pragmatist. This involves conceding that belief in the absence of evidence is impossible. We then argue that evidence can play a role in bringing about belief without being a motivating reason for belief, thereby leaving room for practical considerations to serve as motivating reasons. I present two ways in which this can happen. First, agents can use evidence as a mere means by which to believe, with practical considerations serving as motivating reasons for belief, just as we use tools (e.g. a brake pedal) as mere means by which to do something (e.g. slow down) which we are motivated to do for practical reasons. Second, evidence can make it possible for one to choose whether or not to believe – a choice one can then make for practical reasons. These arguments push the debate between the evidentialist and the pragmatist into new territory. It is no longer enough for an evidentialist to insist that belief is impossible without evidence. Even if this is right, the outcome of the debate remains unsettled. It will hang on the ability of the evidentialist to respond to the new pragmatist strategy presented here.
|
Keywords | practical reasons for belief pragmatic reasons for belief pragmatism evidentialism basing relation motivating reason internalism practical reason |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2018, 2019 |
DOI | 10.1111/nous.12253 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.
The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation.E. J. Lowe & Stephen P. Stich - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):98.
View all 30 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.
Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Guy Axtell - 2019 - Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.
Doxastic Divergence and the Problem of Comparability. Pragmatism Defended Further.Anne Meylan - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):199-216.
View all 28 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press.
Transparency and the Ethics of Belief.Christopher Howard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1191-1201.
In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief.Stephanie Leary - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):529-542.
Motivating Reason to Slow the Factive Turn in Epistemology.J. Drake - forthcoming - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-22.
The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.
Are Epistemic Reasons Ever Reasons to Promote?Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3):353-360.
A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism.Andrew E. Reisner - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-9.
Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):17 - 27.
Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality.Maria Alvarez - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3293-3310.
Reasons and Motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2018-03-18
Total views
584 ( #13,924 of 2,497,820 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
82 ( #9,053 of 2,497,820 )
2018-03-18
Total views
584 ( #13,924 of 2,497,820 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
82 ( #9,053 of 2,497,820 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads