In Brill Studies in Skepticism (forthcoming)

Authors
Susanna Rinard
Harvard University
Abstract
Many have thought that it is impossible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic that we have knowledge of the external world. This paper aims to show how this could be done. I argue, while appealing only to premises that a skeptic could accept, that it is not rational to believe external world skepticism, because doing so commits one to more extreme forms of skepticism in a way that is self-undermining. In particular, the external world skeptic is ultimately committed to believing a proposition P while believing that she shouldn’t believe P, an irrational combination of beliefs. Suspending judgment on skepticism is also problematic, for similar reasons; and, I argue, rational dilemmas are not possible; so, we should believe that skepticism is false.
Keywords Skepticism  External World Skepticism  Memory Skepticism  Reasoning Skepticism  Self-Defeat  Epistemic Akrasia  Suspending Judgement
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

1% Skepticism.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):271-290.
McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism Etc.Alex Byrne - 2014 - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-02-08

Total views
3,865 ( #420 of 2,343,895 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
299 ( #1,142 of 2,343,895 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes