Sensations and kinaesthetic knowledge

When Wittgenstein said psychology contains conceptual confusions and experimental results, one item he had in mind was the psycho-physiological theory of kinaesthesis, which offers an account of how we know limb movement and position. The aim of this essay is to develop and evaluate the objections to that theory which have been produced by Wittgenstein, Melden and Anscombe. That project involves specifying clearly what is involved in the theory, resolving various disagreements between the critics, showing the pattern of the objections, and lastly evaluating the success of the case against the theory. That case amounts to the thesis that the kinaesthetic sensations we do have simply are not adequate to the evidential burden placed on them by the theory. Unless one thinks that they must constitute such evidence (the piece of conceptual confusion) no one would have thought that they do so
Keywords Commentary  Epistemology  Psychology  Theory  Wittgenstein
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DOI 10.5840/pra1982818
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