The Principle of Indifference and Imprecise Probability

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):110-114 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Sometimes different partitions of the same space each seem to divide that space into propositions that call for equal epistemic treatment. Famously, equal treatment in the form of equal point-valued credence leads to incoherence. Some have argued that equal treatment in the form of equal interval-valued credence solves the puzzle. This paper shows that, once we rule out intervals with extreme endpoints, this proposal also leads to incoherence

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Roger white’s argument against imprecise credences.Dylan Dodd - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):69-77.
Chancy accuracy and imprecise credence.Jennifer Carr - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):67-81.
Against Radical Credal Imprecision.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):157-165.
Vague Credence.Aidan Lyon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3931-3954.
A dilemma for the imprecise bayesian.Namjoong Kim - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1681-1702.
Imprecise Probability and Higher Order Vagueness.Susanne Rinard - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):257-273.
Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-05-08

Downloads
2,451 (#3,864)

6 months
237 (#12,184)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Susanna Rinard
Harvard University

References found in this work

A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.
How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James M. Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.
The Bayesian and the Dogmatist.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):169-185.
Against Radical Credal Imprecision.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):157-165.

View all 6 references / Add more references