The Principle of Indifference and Imprecise Probability

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):110-114 (2014)
Susanna Rinard
Harvard University
Sometimes different partitions of the same space each seem to divide that space into propositions that call for equal epistemic treatment. Famously, equal treatment in the form of equal point-valued credence leads to incoherence. Some have argued that equal treatment in the form of equal interval-valued credence solves the puzzle. This paper shows that, once we rule out intervals with extreme endpoints, this proposal also leads to incoherence
Keywords interval‐valued probability  imprecise probability  principle of indifference  imprecise credence
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.118
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References found in this work BETA

How Probabilities Reflect Evidence.James Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153–178.
The Bayesian and the Dogmatist.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):169-185.
Against Radical Credal Imprecision.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):157-165.

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