What is claimed in a Kantian judgment of taste?

Against interpretations of Kant that would assimilate the universality claim in judgments of taste either to moral demands or to theoretical assertions, I argue that it is for Kant a normative requirement shared with ordinary empirical judgments. This raises the question of why the universal agreement required by a judgment of taste should consist in the sharing of a feeling, rather than simply in the sharing of a thought. Kant’s answer is that in a judgment of taste, a feeling assumes the role of predicate. Such a solution presents a problem as serious as the one it purports to solve.
Keywords Kant  aesthetics  judgment  taste  universal validity  universal communicability
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2005.0103
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PhilPapers Archive Miles Rind, What is claimed in a Kantian judgment of taste?
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