Negation, Denial, and Rejection

Philosophy Compass 6 (9):622-629 (2011)
Abstract
At least since [Frege, 1960] and [Geach, 1965], there has been some consensus about the relation between negation, the speech act of denial, and the attitude of rejection: a denial, the consensus has had it, is the assertion of a negation, and a rejection is a belief in a negation. Recently, though, there have been notable deviations from this orthodox view. Rejectivists have maintained that negation is to be explained in terms of denial or rejection, rather than vice versa. Some other theorists have maintained that negation is a separate phenomenon from denial, and that neither is to be explained in terms of the other. In this paper, I present and consider these heterodox theories of the relation between negation, denial, and rejection
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00422.x
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References found in this work BETA
Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
A Natural History of Negation.Laurence Horn - 1989 - University of Chicago Press.
Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.Graham Priest - 2005 - Oxford University Press.

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Reprint Of: A More General General Proof Theory.Wansing Heinrich - 2017 - Journal of Applied Logic 25:23-46.

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