The current status of research on concept combination

Mind and Language 10 (1-2):72-104 (1995)
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Abstract

Understanding novel phrases (e.g. upside‐down daisy) and classifying objects in categories named by phrases ought to have common properties, but you'd never know it from current theories. The best candidate for both jobs is the Theory Theory, but it faces difficulties when theories are impoverished. A potential solution is a dual approach that couples theories (representations‐about categories) with fixed mentalese expressions (representations‐of categories). Both representations combine information in parallel when understanding phrases. Although there are objections to the notion that theories can combine, some of them lose their force when applied to a suitable dual model.

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Citations of this work

How To Conceptually Engineer Conceptual Engineering?Manuel Gustavo Isaac - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
Concepts are not a natural kind.Edouard Machery - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (3):444-467.
The plurality of concepts.Daniel Aaron Weiskopf - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):145-173.
Splitting concepts.Gualtiero Piccinini & Sam Scott - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (4):390-409.

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The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

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