On the most open question in the history of mathematics: A discussion of Maddy

Philosophia Mathematica 2 (2):109-121 (1994)
In this paper, I argue against Penelope Maddy's set-theoretic realism by arguing (1) that it is perfectly consistent with mathematical Platonism to deny that there is a fact of the matter concerning statements which are independent of the axioms of set theory, and that (2) denying this accords further that many contemporary Platonists assert that there is a fact of the matter because they are closet foundationalists, and that their brand of foundationalism is in radical conflict with actual mathematical practice.
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/2.2.109
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D. Sherry (1997). On Mathematical Error. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (3):393-416.

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