Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):164-174 (2021)

Authors
Olle Risberg
Uppsala University
Jens Johansson
Uppsala University
Erik Carlson
Uppsala Universitet
Abstract
ABSTRACT Suppose that, for every possible event and person who would exist whether or not the event were to occur, there is a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were to occur, and a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were not to occur. Do facts about such connections between events and well-being levels always suffice to determine whether an event would harm or benefit a person? Many seemingly attractive accounts of harm and benefit entail an affirmative answer to this question, including the widely held Counterfactual Comparative Account. In this paper, however, we argue that all such accounts will be unsuccessful.
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2019.1705363
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References found in this work BETA

Well-Being and Death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Harm: Omission, Preemption, Freedom.Nathan Hanna - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):251-73.
The Asymmetry: A Solution.Melinda A. Roberts - 2011 - Theoria 77 (4):333-367.

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Citations of this work BETA

Causal Accounts of Harming.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

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