Concepts and Perceptual Belief: How (Not) to Defend Recognitional Concepts

Acta Analytica 25 (4):369-391 (2010)

Authors
Bradley Rives
Indiana University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
Recognitional concepts have the following characteristic property: thinkers are disposed to apply them to objects merely on the basis of undergoing certain perceptual experiences. I argue that a prominent strategy for defending the existence of constitutive connections among concepts, which appeals to thinkers’ semantic-cum-conceptual intuitions, cannot be used to defend the existence of recognitional concepts. I then outline and defend an alternative argument for the existence of recognitional concepts, which appeals to certain psychological laws
Keywords Concepts  Perception  Recognitional concepts  Concept atomism  Conceptual role semantics
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-010-0092-y
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References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.

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