Utilitas 20 (3):323-333 (2008)

Authors
Eduardo Rivera-López
Johannes Gutenberg Universität, Mainz
Abstract
In this article I explore a kind of tragic choice that has not received due attention, one in which you have to save only one of two persons but the probability of saving is not equal (and all other things are equal). Different proposals are assessed, taking as models proposals for a much more discussed tragic choice situation: saving different numbers of persons. I hold that cases in which (only) numbers are different are structurally similar to cases in which (only) probabilities are different. After a brief defense of this claim, I conclude that some version of consequentialism seems more promising for offering a plausible solution to the probability case
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820808003178
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Contractualism on Saving the Many.R. Kumar - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):165-170.
Selecting People Randomly.John Broome - 1984 - Ethics 95 (1):38-55.

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Citations of this work BETA

Should the Probabilities Count?Katharina Berndt Rasmussen - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):205-218.
Hierarchical Consequentialism.Re'em Segev - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (3):309-330.
Risk, Calamity and Apology.Marko Ahteensuu - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (2):449-463.

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