Which Are the Genuine Properties?

Metaphilosophy 46 (1):104-126 (2015)

Authors
Bradley Rives
Indiana University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
This article considers three views about which properties are genuine. According to the first view, we should look to successful commonsense and scientific explanations in determining which properties are genuine. On this view, predicates that figure in such explanations thereby pick out genuine properties. According to the second view, the only predicates that pick out genuine properties are those that figure in our best scientific explanations. On this view, predicates that figure in commonsense explanations pick out genuine properties only if such explanations are vindicated by the sciences. According to the third view, the only genuine properties are the fundamental, microphysical ones. On this view, although there are “higher-level” predicates that figure in true commonsense and scientific explanations, there are no “higher-level” properties corresponding to such predicates. The article argues that the third view is superior to the others
Keywords physicalism  reduction  properties  nonreductive physicalism  mental causation
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DOI 10.1111/meta.12122
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References found in this work BETA

Nature’s Metaphysics.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.

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