Authors
Eduardo Rivera-López
Johannes Gutenberg Universität, Mainz
Abstract
Nozick's well-known Experience Machine argument can be considered a typically successful argument: as far as I know, it has not been discussed much and has been widely seen as conclusive, or at least convincing enough to refute the mental-state versions of utilitarianism. I believe that if his argument were conclusive, its destructive effect would be even stronger. It would not only refute mental-state utilitarianism, but all theories considering a certain subjective mental state as the only valuable state. I shall call these theories "mental state welfarist theories." I do not know whether utilitarianism or, in general, mental-state welfarism is plausible, but I doubt that Nozick's argument is strong enough to prove that it is not.
Keywords Conference Proceedings  Contemporary Philosophy
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 9781634350518
DOI 10.5840/wcp20-paideia199840722
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,784
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What's Wrong with the Experience Machine?Christopher Belshaw - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):573-592.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Experience Machine and Mental State Theories of Well-Being.Jason Kawall - 1999 - Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (3):381-387.
Mental Statism and the Experience Machine.Adam J. Kolber - 1994 - Bard Journal of Social Sciences 3:10-17.
Hedonism and the Experience Machine.Alex Barber - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (2):257 - 278.
Experience Machines: The Philosophy of Virtual Worlds.Mark Silcox (ed.) - 2017 - London: Rowman & Littlefield.
Choosing the Experience Machine.Steven M. Cahn & Christine Vitrano - 2013 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 20 (1):52-58.
The Ontological Meta-Argument.Elijah Millgram - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):331-334.
The Experience Machine.Ben Bramble - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (3):136-145.
Has Nozick Justified the State?Charles Sayward & Wayne Wasserman - 1981 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (4):411-415.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-05-08

Total views
10 ( #883,117 of 2,463,136 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #299,108 of 2,463,136 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes