Mathematical nominalism and measurement

Philosophia Mathematica 18 (1):53-73 (2010)
Abstract
In this paper I defend mathematical nominalism by arguing that any reasonable account of scientific theories and scientific practice must make explicit the empirical non-mathematical grounds on which the application of mathematics is based. Once this is done, references to mathematical entities may be eliminated or explained away in terms of underlying empirical conditions. I provide evidence for this conclusion by presenting a detailed study of the applicability of mathematics to measurement. This study shows that mathematical nominalism may be regarded as a methodological approach to applicability, illuminating the use of mathematics in science
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2010
DOI 10.1093/philmat/nkp010
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,749
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Conservativeness and Incompleteness.Stewart Shapiro - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (9):521-531.
Science Without Numbers by Hartry H. Field. [REVIEW]David Malament - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (9):523-534.
How Nominalist is Hartry Field's Nominalism?Michael D. Resnik - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (2):163 - 181.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2010-02-06

Total downloads
39 ( #137,228 of 2,197,364 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #299,438 of 2,197,364 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature