Bulletin of the Section of Logic 34 (3):177-190 (2005)

Gemma Robles
Universidad de León
José M. Méndez
Universidad de Salamanca
Francisco Salto
Universidad de León
The concept of constructive negation we refer to in this paper is (minimally) intuitionistic in character (see [1]). The idea is to understand the negation of a proposition A as equivalent to A implying a falsity constant of some sort. Then, negation is introduced either by means of this falsity constant or, as in this paper, by means of a propositional connective defined with the constant. But, unlike intuitionisitc logic, the type of negation we develop here is, of course, devoid of paradoxes of relevance.
Keywords Relevance Logics  Substructural Logics  Minimal Negation
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