Utilitas 3 (1):113 (1991)
Maximizing want-satisfaction per se is a relatively unattractive aspiration, for it seems to assume that wants are somehow disembodied entities with independent moral claims all of their own. Actually, of course, they are possessed by particular people. What preference-utilitarians should be concerned with is how people's lives go—the fulfilment of their projects and the satisfaction of their desires. In an old-fashioned way of talking, it is happy people rather than happiness per se that utilitarians should be striving to produce
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Utilitarian Deontologies? On Preference Utilitarianism and Agent-Relative Value.Krister Bykvist - 1996 - Theoria 62 (1-2):124-143.
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